Terrorism is as old as time, but modern technologies empower fanatics to
inflict remarkable harm. Enemies of the West recognise the folly of going
head to head with its overwhelmingly powerful conventional forces.
Asymmetric warfare offers the only realistic prospect of imposing their
will, and where once our security relied on tanks and Spitfires, today
spooks and policemen man the front line.
How good, though, are the new centurions? It is often said that few senior
policemen would rise above the rank of sergeant-major in the army. Assistant
Commissioner Andy Hayman led the Met’s anti-terrorist operations from 2005
to 2007. He was at the forefront of investigations into the 7/7 London
bombings and other violent plots that followed. He became mired in
controversy and recriminations, and resigned at the end of 2007.
His account of his own part in Britain’s struggle with terrorism reads like
the ghosted tale it is. Hayman’s voice is that of the quick, sharp, chippy
copper through the ages. His narrative lacks any hint of the sophistication
of top soldiers’ books about their own trade: “I never shied away from the
tough jobs — in fact I relished them”; “Before I had even settled into the
job, I found myself challenging the commissioner.” His judgments are
unshaded. He thought Tony Blair wonderful, Eliza Manningham-Buller, the
former head of MI5, “awesome”, and respected Charles Clarke as home
secretary. But he despised the politicians’ posturing, especially at
meetings of the COBRA crisis management committee: “There was so much
jockeying for position and attention.” He thought Ian Blair as commissioner
became remote and aloof.
The strongest message of the book is about Hayman’s impatience with
namby-pamby civil libertarians who shrink from using anti-terrorist tools he
thinks vital, above all CCTV cameras and 90-day detention. He dismisses ID
cards as too easy to forge, and argues strongly for a national
anti-terrorist force, less dependent on provincial whims. Some chief
constables have, for instance, shown themselves wary of using
stop-and-search powers after terror attacks, lest they upset local
minorities.
Hayman vents his frustration about lack of co-operation from Muslim
communities: “Intelligence from the public about terrorism is negligible.”
Neighbours and contacts are surely alerted by bombers’ behaviour, not
least their acquisition of chemicals and fertiliser. But nobody lifts a
phone to the police. Loyalty to fellow Muslims and alienation from the
authorities keep mouths shut. It is an alarming indictment of communal
relations, that citizens of this country decline to reveal suspicions about
the murderous intentions of fanatics.
Hayman describes the shock at a Yard meeting in July 2005 when it was reported
that the man shot by armed-response officers on the tube at Stockwell
appeared to have been an innocent bystander, Jean Charles de Menezes. “The
room was absolutely silent for what felt like a lifetime, though it was
probably only a few seconds.”
Yet his own attitude to the shooting is robust. “The harsh truth is that there
is little alternative to the shoot-to-kill policy... Circumstances led to
the mistake, not the strategy.” These are weasel words. The stunning blow
that the Stockwell shooting dealt to public confidence derived from the
institutional incompetence that it exposed.
There have been too many other incidents in which the police have shot dead
deranged men who were not even terrorist suspects, but merely thought to
pose a public threat. Once upon a time, it would have been a matter of pride
for officers to try to bring in such people alive. The culture of modern
policing, by contrast, demands that they take no chances with their own
safety or anybody else’s.
Britain’s policemen do a reasonable job by international standards. But, in
the new world of potential nuclear and cyber-terrorism, nothing but the best
will do in the upper ranks of law enforcement. Today, we do not have this.
It is shameful that, for instance, the Met’s top men jumped on Tory MP
Damian Green with hobnailed boots, sending anti-terrorist officers to
arrest him in what was a blatantly political assault.
Many policemen adhere to a cynical, inward-looking culture that scorns the
scruples of civilians. Hayman’s tabloid-headline book suggests that he
follows this tradition. He may have been an adequate anti-terrorist
officer, but he seems to lack the ability to see his own role in the context
of the society that he served.
Policemen and intelligence officers deserve sympathy in confronting the huge
problems of managing a continuing violent threat amid societies on a peace
footing. Hayman’s tale describes successes that deserve applause, but also
systemic weaknesses that must be addressed.
Richard English is an academic at Queen’s University, Belfast who has been
studying terror, and especially the IRA, for several decades. He offers a
short, common-sense primer to understanding terrorists and their
limitations. Rather than being cowardly maniacs, he says, most are engaged
in a struggle for power that may cause them to adopt extreme means, but is
nonetheless waged rationally, in their terms.
English quotes Professor Bruce Hoffman’s sensible definition of terrorism as
politically motivated violence, “designed to have far-reaching psychological
repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target”, carried out by a
sub-national, non-uniformed organisation “with an identifiable chain of
command”. Its actions are designed to create a shock impact disproportionate
to their material significance. Targets and methods are explicitly tailored
to inspire public outrage.
It is all but impossible to eradicate terrorism. Like most other human
problems, it must be lived with and managed. The author suggests that we
should be heartened by terrorism’s high failure rate. Many campaigns peter
out. The IRA has not achieved a united Ireland.
Where possible, root social and political problems that enable a few fanatics
to attract wider followings must be addressed, as with the grievances of
Catholics in Northern Ireland. Al Qaeda provides a more difficult challenge.
It is scarcely possible to meet its demand for a global caliphate. Hayman
suggests that Al Qaeda exercises far more direct control of terrorist
activity in Britain than some pundits acknowledge. Politically, the best we
can do is what Barack Obama already does — extend a hand of friendship to
the Muslim world.
It is mistaken to over-militarise responses. Terrorism can and should be
addressed within a framework of legality, which rules out torture or
detention without trial. Intelligence is the key weapon. Success depends
overwhelmingly upon information, and thus upon the quality of people doing
the gathering.
English’s book has little to say that has not been long recognised by
thoughtful students of the problem. The Obama administration recognises the
calamitous errors of its predecessor’s “war on terror”, which the author
justly castigates. But western governments continue to need constant
admonitions, such as English provides, to adopt proportionate rather than
draconian responses.
Modern communications, especially the internet, provide terrorists with
expertise about means of damaging societies as never before. But technology
also provides governments with tools that, unless employed with the
utmost discretion, threaten the very liberties democracies seek to defend.
The Terrorist-Hunters by Andy Hayman with Margaret Gilmore
Bantam £18.99 pp342
Terrorism by Richard English
OUP £12.99 pp178
