April 21 2006
Jacqueline Rose
THE QUESTION OF ZION
202pp. Princeton University Press. Pounds 12.95 (US $19.95)
0 691 11750 0
Idith Zertal
ISRAEL'S HOLOCAUST AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONHOOD
248pp. Cambridge University Press. Pounds 19.99. (US $30)
0 521 85096 7
Zionism, the movement that led to the establishment of the state of Israel, is
now called by some the worst enemy of the Jewish people. In fact, Zionism
has not had a good press for some time. There was a great deal of opposition
to it from the very beginning both from outside the Jewish community and
from within. The very religious were against it because to move to the holy
country (except to die and be buried there) before the coming of the Messiah
was sacrilegious. Marxists were against it because it was a reactionary
movement, a relapse into narrow nationalism at a time when the whole world
was surmounting such narrow egotism, moving towards proletarian
internationalism. Whatever the differences between Stalinists and
Trotskyites, on Zionism there was full agreement between them. Most liberal
and conservative Jews felt themselves culturally and socially deeply rooted
in the countries in which they lived and regarded Zionism as unnecessary and
even harmful. True, Zion appeared in their prayers, but, as in other
religions, there was less and less praying. By the time Balfour made his
famous declaration in November 1917, most Jews saw no reason to move to a
faraway, primitive country of which they knew little. Zion for most of them
had become an abstraction.
All over Europe and America, Zionism was a small minority up to the 1930s,
when it suddenly appeared that European Jews faced a mortal danger which had
not been foreseen by Zionism's critics. The Zionists had been more aware
than others of the coming threat, but there was no independent Jewish state
and in the end Jewish Palestine could accept only a few hundred thousand,
not the millions who eventually perished. And so, by 1948, when Israel came
into being it was a very small entity, with little more than half a million
Jews living there.
True, during the decades that followed their number grew substantially but it
still remained a small country. To engage for a moment in counterfactual
history - what if the Ottoman Empire had collapsed not in 1918 but after the
Crimean War, or preferably after the Russian-Turkish war of 1827-8? What if
European Jews had moved there at that time and what if, with a birth rate
like that of the Gaza strip, their number was now 50 or 60 million or more?
What if in that Greater Palestine extending from the Nile to the Euphrates,
substantial oilfields had been discovered? True, there still might have been
a war with its neighbours -such wars were customary at the time -but
eventually the refugees (if any) would have been integrated or resettled,
for one does not trifle with a major, powerful country; it would be an
honoured member of the United Nations and Israel's bitter critics would be
writing songs of praise for this miraculous rebirth of an old people in a
spirit of humanism and freedom, a shining example for all mankind.
These are, of course, fantasies. Unfortunately, many Israelis have failed to
understand that on the international level there is not one law for all, and
that small countries, especially if they have powerful enemies, cannot
afford to behave as if they were great powers. Why should they be judged by
standards other than the rest of the world, why should they be singled out
for misdeeds that in the case of others were forgiven or ignored? Hundreds
of thousands have been murdered in Rwanda, in Sudan and Algeria and other
places, but the protest and revulsion (let alone the calls for intervention)
have been limited, and condemnation by the United Nations infrequent. The
fact that others have committed greater crimes cannot be an excuse, but how
to explain that Israel became the butt of attack, of constant threats, of
near total isolation? The brief answer is that small might be beautiful in
other respects but not in international affairs.
The main accusation against Israel was that it had been born in sin, that
violence had been involved, that injustice had been done to Palestinians.
This was quite true, but it was also true that it is difficult to think of
any country (except perhaps some Pacific island) that has come into being as
the result of a civil contract without violence and bloodshed.
However, was it not true that the early Zionists from Herzl onwards had been
oblivious to the fact that Palestine was not empty and that they had ignored
the local inhabitants, being totally preoccupied with the fate of the Jews?
True enough, but the critics usually pass in silence over the number of
those involved at the time. The year that Herzl wrote his Jewish State
(1896), the number of non-Jews living in Palestine was about 400,000-450,000
(including non-Muslims and non-Arabs), which was about one quarter of the
population of Vienna, where Herzl made his home. In these conditions the
early Zionists should perhaps be forgiven if they thought that the problem
of the indigenous population was not insoluble.
But was the establishment of a Jewish (and Palestinian Arab) state really a
necessity? would a binational state not have been preferable? Perhaps so,
even though experience elsewhere from India and Sri Lanka to Cyprus and
Yugoslavia has not been encouraging. There was among the Zionists a group
consisting of some of the best minds and purest souls which tried hard and
over many years to achieve such a solution. But it remained small and
uninfluential because it could not find a partner among the Palestinians
(and if they found one, he was likely to be killed within a few weeks or
months). The Arabs saw no reason to give up full sovereignty and to give the
Jews equal rights as far as running the country was concerned. If there was
a Jewish problem in Europe, it was neither their fault nor their
responsibility.
The absence of an agreement led inevitably to the UN partition resolution of
1948 providing for the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state in
Palestine. It was based on concessions on both sides. The Zionists had to
forgo Jerusalem, not only the Old City but also the Jewish part which was to
become a corpus separandum. The Jews accepted this, but the Arabs did not;
they went to war and they lost.
Seen in retrospect, the years between 1948 and 1967 were relatively quiet,
despite the Suez war and occasional attacks from across the border. True,
the Arab states did not accept the existence of a Jewish state and there was
talk of throwing the Jews into the sea. But, by and large, uneasy
coexistence prevailed.
This state of affairs could have lasted for a long time but Nasser, for
reasons not entirely clear to this day, asked for the withdrawal of UN
troops from Sinai and imposed an embargo on Israeli ships in the Red Sea
which led to the Six Day War and the great Israeli victory. But the great
victory (the occupation of Gaza, all of Jerusalem and the West Bank) turned
into a great calamity, as some foresaw even at the time. Initially there had
been no desire on the Israeli side to keep these territories indefinitely
-it was expected that all or most of them (except Jerusalem) would be
returned within the framework of a peace treaty. But the heads of Arab
governments in their wisdom decided not to negotiate, let alone recognize
Israel, and the territories remained in Israeli hands. And thus the
settlements were established and since the Palestinians resisted Israeli
rule there was violence and counterviolence and the cycle of terrorism and
repression commenced.
Israel should have got rid, unilaterally if need be, of the territories as
quickly as possible to preserve the democratic character of the country.
Instead, the longer the occupation lasted, the more deeply ingrained among
sections of Israeli opinion became the conviction not to give up territories
since the other side was not willing to make peace anyway. The events of
1967 were seen as a commandment from heaven. Thus the great victory turned
into a political defeat and the image of the ugly Israeli emerged, murderer
of women and children, guilty of unspeakable crimes, a nightmare of cruel
oppression
The situation created after 1967 cost Israel much sympathy and generated a
hostile literature which often argued that not only the occupation policy
was to blame, but that Zionism had somehow been blemished from the outset.
One of the more interesting such recent works is Jacqueline Rose's Question
of Zion. The author is a Professor of English Literature at Queen Mary,
University of London, with an interest in psychoanalysis. She has studied
certain strands in modern Jewish intellectual history and reached some firm
conclusions and even suggestions for solutions to the conflict. Her
conclusion is that messianism has been the bane of Zionism, colouring it
(including secular Zionism) at every turn. Seen in this light, Theodor
Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, was no more than a second Sabbetai
Zvi, the seventeenth-century pseudo-messiah who promised to lead the Jews
back to Palestine (and ended up a convert to Islam).
Indeed, there were for centuries messianic hopes among Jews, mainly in Eastern
Europe, even though they became weaker and weaker as time went by. It is not
too difficult to find invocations of these hopes in the works of a variety
of writers and even some public figures. But how important were these
sentiments and hopes politically, that is to say in the real world rather
than in the world of ideas? The brief answer is "not very". The early
Zionists emphatically dissociated themselves from the old religious
messianic variety, disavowing all mysticism and no longer identifying with
messianism (the words are Max Nordau's, another founder of modern Zionism).
Professor Rose does not deny this but, being a psychoanalyst, she is sceptical
and looks hard for subconscious messianic motives. This, to stress once
again, is not too difficult, for the revived secular Hebrew language,
especially of the early years of the twentieth century, was replete with
concepts such as "redemption", which the author believes were explosive and
potentially catastrophic. But Rose mistakes symbolism for reality; the
Zionist movement contained a religious element from the very beginning
-although the ultra-orthodox rejected it tout court but the religious
Zionists were relatively uninfluential, they were not messianic and above
all, they were the most moderate politically, averse to all political
adventures.
As for the "explosive language" which the author finds so meaningful, it had
become even by the 1940s a butt of jokes ("Zionut"), not always in good
taste; for many of the young generation in Palestine/Israel, these were
empty and pompous phrases used in speeches on festive occasions but not
taken very seriously. The 2005 Israeli Dictionary of Slang by Rubik
Rosenthal defines Zionism as "preaching moralism". In any case Zionism was
not, as Rose writes, one of the "most potent collective movements of the
twen-tieth century". There was no sudden messianic revival; it became of
political importance only because of Hitler and the growing persecution of
Jews in Europe. Zion was seen not as the fulfilment of messianic hopes, but
as a place where Jews could hope to escape at a time when virtually all
other avenues were closed.
It was not by accident that Zion (meaning the city of Jerusalem) attracted
very few of the newcomers to Palestine, and later to Israel -and of the
Zionist leaders no one settled there. For Jerusalem (Zion) was everything
they resented from the diaspora. They wanted a new modern society and Zion,
paradoxically, was not Zionist. Palestine, to be sure, was not regarded as a
mere temporary asylum for refugees such as Shanghai but a place where Jews
could live freely masters of their own destiny (to the extent that small
peoples can ever be truly independent).
While there are occasional references in this book to such issues as the water
supply in contemporary Israel, it is essentially an essay in the history of
ideas, or to be precise, some under-currents to the exclusion of others. And
for this reason, however emphatic her political opinions, the author seldom
descends to the level of political realities. She thinks that Zionism should
not have become a national(ist) movement aiming at the establishment of a
state. But she does not discuss alternatives.
Martin Buber was an important religious thinker and, as an opponent of
statehood, he is one of the heroes of this book. What should he have done in
1938? Should he have followed the personal advice of Mahatma Gandhi who told
him and the rest of the Jews to stay in Germany and practise satyagraha
(passive resistance)? He did not do so even though by moving to Jerusalem he
may have contributed to the aggravation of the Jewish-Arab conflict. What
was the alternative to statehood facing the Jews of Palestine in 1946-7,
since the other side rejected a binational solution? Hannah Arendt, another
heroine of this book, advised them to look closely at (and to emulate) the
Soviet nationalities policy, which she thought was a success story -in
retrospect this does not appear such a wonderful idea either.
The author recalls time and again the warnings of the late Gershom Scholem,
the great student of Jewish mysticism, against infusing messianism into
politics, but side by side with such well-made points there are strange
asides, such as the alleged impact of the Lohengrin performance in Paris in
1895 on Herzl and Hitler
According to her narrative, the very same performance of Wagner's opera which
inspired Herzl to write the Jewish State inspired Hitler to write Mein
Kampf. But Hitler would have been aged six or seven at the time, and never
was in Paris except for a few hours in 1940. Students of Lacan (of which
Rose is one) should recall what the master wrote about the paranoiac element
in all knowledge.
Instead of looking for the disastrous impact of messianism where it did not
exist, it might have been more rewarding to analyse the collective Jerusalem
syndrome of 1967 ("Temple Mount is in our hands"), which had indeed very
negative political consequences, turning a political and territorial dispute
into a religious conflict. Messianism was involved but other explanations
are also possible. The Jews of Palestine and Israel had been admonished for
a long time to shed their Western traditions and mentality and to become
integrated ideologically as well as politically and socially in the East.
And so (partly as the result of the immigration of Jews from Eastern
countries, partly as the result of a worldwide fundamentalist trend) Israel
did become more Oriental in outlook and its reactions more like those of its
neighbours. This did not cause great joy among those who had suggested
deWesternization earlier on, but it is a development that could have been
foreseen.
Jacqueline Rose's knowledge of recent Jewish and Israeli history is less than
perfect -localities are misplaced, a well-known female literary critic
undergoes a sex change, and her general asides are also sometimes doubtful;
Herzl and Vaclav Havel are not (as the author believes) the only political
figures who also wrote plays. From Beaumarchais to Jean Giraudoux, one could
think of a dozen in French literature alone. But these are minor details.
The real weakness of this book is more basic: What could psychoanalysis
contribute to resolving a political conflict? Freud and his main disciples
steered clear of giving advice except in the most general way. Rose plays
the role of the analyst in the therapeutical encounter, but she faces a
problem which may well be insurmountable. The analyst should be detached
(blind himself in Freud's words, or in Bion's who also appears in this
book). What if the analyst has a hopeless aversion to the patient which he
or she cannot possibly overcome? Such a situation is said to occur not that
rarely, and it may be no one's fault. But would it not be preferable in such
cases to refer the patient to a colleague less emotionally involved?
On the other hand, psychoanalysis might be of help in shedding light on why
some Jews write Zionist books and others anti-Zionist. As for the latter,
Jewish self-hatred is frequently invoked, which is not always justified. The
late Professor Y. Leibowitz of Jerusalem, an orthodox Jew and one of the
sharpest critics of the new Israel, was certainly anything but a self-
hating Jew. But if anti-Zionism is the only known Jewish activity of an
individual, the charge deserves to be further explored. Self- hatred is
neither a rare nor a specific Jewish quality (Pascal's "Le moi est
haissable") and the issue deserves to be studied without undue emotion
whether it regards Jansenists, Jews, lapsed Jews or others.
Idith Zertal is a native-born Israeli, she knows the language, literature and
history of modern Israel and can hardly be faulted on matters of detail and
accuracy -except when her temperament gets the better of her judgement, such
as when she claims that the preparation of the Eichmann trial was Ben
Gurion's "finest hour" (which is not meant as a compliment). Israel's
Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood is dedicated to the memory of
Hannah Arendt, who also plays a central role in The Question of Zion; it
would be interesting to know why Hannah Arendt as a political commentator
has so many more admirers among women than among men.
Zertal successfully deconstructs a number of myths in recent Israeli
historiography, beginning with the case of Josef Trumpeldor, a Jewish
officer in the tsarist army who was killed in the defence of Tel Hai in
Galilee against Arab marauders in 1919. Trumpeldor's last words allegedly
were that it was good to die for one's country, which entered the school
books, but it is not certain whether he really said it (and if he said it,
whether it was in Russian or Hebrew). She then proceeds to analyse the
attitude of the Zionist leadership to the resistance fighters in Poland
during the Second World War. As the author sees it, Zionist leaders
overemphasize the role of Zionist inspiration in triggering anti-Nazi
resistance in Poland, and they belittle the role of Communists and Bundist
socialists. But if the Zionists were selective, so is Zertal, who forgets to
mention the role of the right-wing Zionist youth organizations which also
played a certain role in the resistance.
All this is quite interesting, but it is not entirely clear what the author
intended to accomplish other than writing an essay in the history of ideas.
There are such myths in the history of every nation, some ancient, some
modern; there are few scientific certainties concerning the origins of
nations, but merely heroic sagas and tales, usually exaggerated, sometimes
freely invented. Take Switzerland -it is not at all certain whether William
Tell ever lived; and the true story of Joan of Arc or the Chanson de Roland
was almost certainly different from what some school books relate.
This tradition of nationalist hero worship continued among nations which
gained independence only relatively recently; even a Czech patriot forged
some ancient manuscripts. It can be found in America and Russia as well as
Japan, not to mention the Arab world with its martyrs, and there is no
reason to assume that Israel would have been an exception.
It is fascinating to be reminded that a poem by Nathan Alterman in the 1950s
about the heroes of the Jewish resistance in Europe generated a storm. But
it was a very little storm, it did not enter the collective memory of the
national religious in Israel, nor the ultra-orthodox, nor the Moroccan nor
the Russian Jews. In brief, to put it inelegantly, it was a storm in a
teacup, and the young generation in Israel today will not have heard of many
of the myths deconstructed with so much admirable gusto in this book.
The authors of these passionate attacks against Zionism seem to believe that
it is still a potent ideological and political force. But is it really -or
did the Zionist age in Jewish history come to an end many decades ago with
the establishment of the state? The Russian immigrants who came were not
Zionists in their overwhelming majority, nor were those from North Africa.
The orthodox Jews are not Zionists and even the national religious
visionaries of 1967, the radical settlers, are not Zionists in any
meaningful sense. Their doctrine has as much to do with historical Zionism
as Hugo Chavez or Carlos the Jackal with Karl Marx. Contemporary Jerusalem
has a non-or anti-Zionist majority and its mayor is not a Zionist either.
Zionism was a latecomer in the liberal- humanist tradition of 1848, of
Mazzini, Kossuth and Masaryk. It held, with Mazzini, that without a country
of their own the Jews were bound to remain the bastard of humanity. This
kind of national movement was bound to be a disappointment; only political
movements whose histories do not extend beyond the utopian phase retain
their pristine virtue; all others cannot possibly live up to expectations.
It is the old story of Yeats: "Romantic Ireland's dead and gone, It's with
O'Leary in the grave". Since 1948 the history is that of the state of
Israel. The ideology of this state in its post-Zionist phase consists of a
great many strands. The attacks against Zionism at this late stage are
anachronistic (unless one uses Zionist as a code word, as some do, meaning
something quite different). They are not particularly courageous, as some of
the writers of blurbs for these books tend to think; there are no Victoria
Crosses to be gained for flogging a non-existent horse.
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