James Wycliffe Headlam’s review of John Maynard Keynes's The Economic Consequences of the Peace was published in the TLS of January 15, 1920.

Mr. Keynes's work on the Peace Conference is one of a calibre quite different from any of those others which we have hitherto received. Mr. Keynes writes with knowledge ; he was himself one of the chief actors in the Conference, and his book is an important political event. As the chief representative of the British Treasury, as was well known at the time, he put forward certain principles on which the reparation and financial clauses in the Treaty with Germany should be drawn up ; these were eventually rejected and a different scheme was accepted. In consequence, at a late stage in the discussion he resigned, and the book we now have is an explanation and justification of the view which he took throughout, and becomes, therefore, a very incisive, sometimes bitter, always interesting criticism of the financial clauses as they wore eventually drafted.

With the main subject of the book we do not propose to treat in this place. The political aspects have already been fully dealt with in the columns of The Times, and this is not the place to attempt a technical analysis of the very complicated economic problems with which the author deals. We will confine ourselves to saying this, that the criticism which he has put forward is one which cannot be neglected; the country is faced with the alternative — either Mr. Keynes's points are susceptible of answer, and if this be so the nation has a right to demand the answer from those whose advice was accepted; or, if they cannot be answered, then it would be necessary, in the proper form and at the proper time, to take such steps as are required to meet the situation in which we find ourselves.

Let us recognize frankly that all Mr. Keynes says publicly now has been common talk among those who have in any way occupied themselves with these matters. The criticism which he puts forward could not be suppressed, it must find light some time or another, and if it had to be public, it seems to us much better that it should come from this country than from any other. Supposing, as he contends, that a serious mistake has been made in one part of the Treaty, a mistake for which to a large extent not only the British Government but the British nation itself is responsible, then it is entirely in accordance with our traditions that those who differ from this view should frankly state their case. This is what we mean by British liberty. We mean that, supposing one set of men in charge of an important matter have pledged the nation to certain claims which, on more mature judgment, do not appear to be entirely justified, by the working of our free institutions and of our free Press the matter should be frankly and fully discussed among ourselves, so that, if necessary, a revision may be brought about. We owe it, not only to ourselves, but also to our Allies and our enemies, that we should not be frightened of frank, open, and full discussion.

If we turn now from these matters to the book itself there are certain criticisms which it is necessary to make. The cleverness of the work has already received ample recognition. Mr. Keynes shows in his treatment of the problems with which he deals the advantages of the higher form of academic training; he brings great literary ability, a broad view, a clear grasp of general principles, to bear upon the very complicated matters with which he is occupied, and in his hands these questions of coal, exchange, and reparation can be read with pleasure by the non-technical student.

But the book has an importance and an interest beyond the skill with which the author handles his material. The situation from which it has arisen is probably almost unprecedented. It was indeed a bold action of the British Government to place in responsible charge of one of the most important departments a man who, however great his ability, was not a permanent servant of the Crown. For it has been generally supposed that the practical treatment of matters of this kind requires habit engendered by long experience in the responsible routine of business. It is a commonplace among what are called men of the world that academic training actually disqualifies for practical affairs. However this may be, it is impossible to read this book without recognizing that, the experiment was in one way a remarkable success. For Mr. Keynes shows that throughout the turmoil and complications, the intrigues which necessarily attended these great transactions, he was able always to keep before his mind the great matters which were at stake. Not only in the introduction but throughout the book itself we are brought in contact with a mind which always has before it the great issue.

"Paris was a nightmare, and everyone there was morbid. A sense of impending catastrophe overhung the frivolous scene; the futility and smallness of man before the great events confronting him: the mingled significance and unreality of the decisions: levity, blindness, insolence, confused cries from without — all the elements of ancient tragedy were there. Seated indeed amid the theatrical trappings of the French Saloons of State, one could wonder if the extraordinary visages of Wilson and of Clemenceau, with their fixed hue and unchanging characterisation, were really faces at all and not the tragic-comic masks of some strange drama or puppet-show."

Himself an actor in the scene, he looked at if from the point of view of the spirits of Hardy's Dynasts.

To the man of letters, the student of the future, to the philosopher, poet, and the historian, this is pure gain, for it is always profitable that there should be among us those who are aiming at the higher truth. That it is aimed at is clear; has he attained to it? Has he in his picture, which with extraordinary skill he has drawn of the Conference itself, really succeeded in probing to the bottom what happened at Paris? He has drawn for us a notable presentation of the struggle between the two ideals, the peace of reconciliation and justice put forward by the President and the "Carthaginian peace" which, he says, was advocated by Clemenceau and the French, and he has shown us with remarkable dramatic instinct, the way in which these two ideals were confronted in the persons of the protagonists. Clemenceau, careless of all except that which might be, according to his interpretation, for the immediate advantage of France, was ultimately successful in a long-drawn out conflict because President Wilson, with all his great aspirations, was deficient in the practical qualities necessary for realizing them.

In fact the President had thought out nothing; when it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He could have preached a sermon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfilment ; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe. True, but perhaps not the whole truth.

It seems to us that the ultimate criticism of Mr. Keynes's book will be this, that it is the criticism of a man who is occupied with and interested only in one part of the work. For the political side he appears to have little interest or understanding. It is not merely that it falls outside the scope of his work, the brief but frequent references to it are those of a man to whom the whole is unreal. And these references show what seems to us a very grave failure to recognize how much influence the principles enunciated in fact exercised on large portions of the Treaty. After all, it is surely to them that is due the fact, whether it is one to be welcomed or not, that Germany emerges from the war with her unity undestroyed and her territorial integrity unhampered, except in those districts in which cession of territory was clearly enjoined by the principles of the Peace. Mr. Keynes seems to us far too ready to bring charges of insincerity; he speaks with scarcely disguised contempt of the Danzig settlement; surely he might have recognized that here there is to be found, for instance, a genuine endeavour to solve the very difficult problem presented by the right of Poland to have full access to the sea, and the principle that populations should not be handed from one country to another contrary to their own will. The whole spirit of the treatment of the left bank of the Rhine deserves a franker recognition than he accords to it; and even if we agree with him that the Sarre Valley settlement is open to grave criticism, the language he uses about it shows great ignorance as to the real nature of the problem to be dealt with. He gives, indeed, grudging recognition of the work done in these matters by the Prime Minister; a full judgment on the Conference will require that they should be put into far greater prominence than, owing perhaps to the special subject of his book, he gives them.

Now this distinction between the political and economic clauses of the Treaty is really of fundamental importance for this reason. If Europe is to come to peace, the first desideratum is that the political questions of frontier should be permanently determined on such lines as may command general recognition. If this is once achieved, then it will be possible, supposing it seems just and desirable, to approach the economic problems, which are of quite a different character, in a calmer spirit; and revision of them is a matter of a very different character from fundamental stages in the territorial constitution of a State. It is, we may suppose, from a recognition of this that many in responsible positions, who saw with regret and apprehension some of the provisions of the Treaty, considered that it was their duty not to put forward at the moment criticism which might have imperilled the whole work. If we consider Germany alone, then surely it is necessary and it is the duty of all those who occupy themselves with these matters to insist upon the point that, even if revision of the economic chapters is desirable, this can only be granted on the condition that there is full and frank acceptance of the political and territorial settlements. We may suggest that when the territorial settlement is reviewed by historians it is not the German Treaty which will be open to the most serious criticism; and it will ultimately be recognized that there is much more to be placed to the credit of the account of the President and of the Prime Minister than readers of Mr. Keynes's book would imagine.